Showing posts with label data destruction. Show all posts
Showing posts with label data destruction. Show all posts

Friday, 23 December 2011

How does Santa comply with Data Protection Laws?

As a father, I'm naturally keen to protect the Personally Identifiable Information (PII) of my children. Not long after the birth of my son was the infamous incident when Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs (HMRC) lost the PII of every family in the UK with a child under the age of 16... Not a great start.

Another organisation with data on my children is the large North-pole based company run by Santa Claus. Given that he has lists of who has been naughty and nice, and in the assumption that this is a binary definition where everyone falls onto one list or the other, with no scope to fall into a neutral category in-between, these lists must contain the personal data on all children in the world. A further assumption is that the data includes obviously names and addresses of the kids in order to label and subsequently deliver their presents. Data gathered on children in order to put them on one list or the other must include habits and activities throughout the preceding year as well as personal gift preferences in case they ultimately end up on the "nice" list by Christmas Eve.

Data held by Santa on children from the UK is subject to legislation including the UK Data Protection Act 1998. Given that International Law dictates that the North Pole does not fall into the jurisdiction of any one country, Santa is required to demonstrate that appropriate controls are in place to protect this information as it is exported out of the EU. The lack of any national jurisdiction over Santa's organisation also means that he is not subject to any specific local legislation and the onus is therefore entirely on him to put the appropriate controls in place to protect the data.

Data aggregation and data destruction are issues here. Given the PII of every child is held by Santa, the exposure of one or both lists in their entirety would be a significant breach, as demonstrated in the video "Santa gets hacked!". Does Santa keep multiple lists, perhaps segregated by country or ideally smaller geographical areas, to reduce the risk of exposing all data in one go? On the data destruction side, one must presume that once a belief in Santa has gone then a presence on either list is no longer required. The Data Protection Act requires that PII is only held for as long as it is needed, although the aforementioned video suggests that adults and children alike might be affected by a data breach of this kind. I would like assurances that my own data is not only no longer on Santa's systems, but that any logical and physical storage media is appropriately disposed of when no longer needed.

Given my understanding that the storage and processing of this data is all performed at the north-pole and not outsourced or off-shored to another organisation or country, the storage and processing of the data is less of a concern than the transmission and transport of it, particularly around Christmas.

Firstly, the delivery mechanisms for the letters to Santa are somewhat varied. Although the postal service is an acceptable mechanism for delivering this information, the destination address seems quite hazy and the risk of loss mid-delivery is therefore quite high. For those who choose to post their lists by placing them up their chimney stack and using special Santa-magic for transmission, I have concerns over the unknown elements of that delivery mechanism and what controls are in place to protect the data en route. Given that these lists are subsequently found still up the chimney 100 years later, more current data could be exposed in the same way.

Secondly, on Christmas eve Santa sets off with this sleigh and the delivery list. Does this list contain only the information required to deliver the correct presents to the appropriate households or is he taking all the PII around with him? As he enters each house, does he take the list with him or leave it in the sleigh? If the latter, he's leaving himself open to data theft while he's casually downing the latest mince pie and glass of sherry. He may think that the list is safe on the roof, but people got up there to set-up the inflatable Santa and light-up sleigh, so there must be access of some sort.

Finally, is it fair to assume that Santa is moving with the times and now takes the list with him on a smart phone or tablet? The risk of losing a device like this is surely greater than the risk of losing paper records of millions of children. Does he link up to the North Pole to get last minute list updates about those children who won't go to bed on Christmas Eve, moving them from the "nice" list to the "naughty" list during his travels... and is he doing it over your wifi?!? What policies around the use of mobile devices is in place and how are communications between the sleigh and Santa HQ protected? Encrypting the data and doing so from every country he delivers to might create further problems around cryptographic export controls and he may have instead opted for the easier life of sending it in the clear!

Anyway, that's enough from me for this year... I need to get my Freedom of Information request over to the North Pole before tomorrow night. Have a Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year.

Image: luigi diamanti / FreeDigitalPhotos.net

Thursday, 24 November 2011

Data destruction - don't forget the printers

Last week my Multi-Function Printer (MFP) gave up the ghost and given its age and the probable cost of repair, I decided to invest in a new one. Despite the fact that it would no longer actually print any more, I'm aware that there is a thriving "repair or spares" market out there and I probably could have got a bit of cash for it intact. However, many modern peripherals of this type store data for spooling print jobs and processing scans and copies. The storage media in the device could still contain details of documents printed, scanned and copied. I know from when I've run multiple-page documents through the document feeder to make multiple collated copies that it will easily store the entire document before churning out the copies. When I think of some of the data that's been through my device, I'm not willing to take the risk of letting it go without taking further precautions.

However, for these type of home/small office devices, the risk is quite low as the storage is integrated into the electronics and as far as I'm aware for this type of device is volatile memory that shouldn't have any data on it once the power is off - the possibility of data remenance in this type of memory is still present though. It is therefore more difficult to interrogate and probably not worth the time of a data thief, given the amount and quality of data they may ultimately expect to get out of it.

Business MFPs used in offices are more likely to be a target as they often contain standard hard drives, storing a lot more data and can be more easily interrogated. Potentially there is a greater reward for the data thief as the information they contain would be more valuable to other parties than what may be contained on a typical home printer. Organisations therefore need to ensure that they don't inadvertently disclose confidential data that has been printed, scanned or copied through these devices by not taking appropriate measures when they are sold or otherwise disposed of.

The case for selling these devices intact is that refurbished office MFPs are still of some value. However, the additional benefit of the office MFP is that the data storage medium can be more easily replaced or appropriately cleansed. This also doesn't have to be a difficult task with many enterprise MFP manufacturers having security documentation (often composed in partnership with organisations such as NIST) for how to ensure that these devices are managed, operated and disposed of securely.

This certainly isn't a new issue and there have been plenty of articles talking about the risks associated with this as well as media reports about the data that has been recovered from devices bought from various organisations. However, My recent MFP replacement prompted me to write this post as these devices are not always appreciated for their data storage capabilities and can be one of the easily missed controls, exposing some of the most confidential information.

Image: renjith krishnan / FreeDigitalPhotos.net